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A B S T R A C T   
This work analyses a post-disaster case study in Guatemala where a large landslide named “Los Chorros” affected 
several communities and one of the country’s main highways. Risk managers, starting from their own assess-
ment, decided to respond in a way that did not coincide with the interests of the affected population. Local 
communities assessed the disaster risk situation from a different conception of risk and developed an alternative 
solution. Competition for priorities and solutions for risk management reveals that disaster risk is a complex and 
holistic concept, comprised of a large set of components. The first objective of this work was to identify the 
criteria and components chosen by each actor to define disaster risk and the approaches employed during risk 
assessment. The second objective concerned the study of strategies deployed by actors to legitimize both their 
assessment of disaster risk and its treatment. Using interviews and observation of practices it is possible to affirm 
that the actors consider very varied criteria when defining a risk situation. These criteria are material, symbolic, 
natural, economic, social and are linked to the types of vulnerabilities that actors face and recognize. Risk 
management measures depend on the specific arbitrations of each actor and their ability to be recognized as 
legitimate. The challenge for decision makers is to involve the various stakeholders, integrate the risk perceptions 
and assessments carried out by each actor and subsequently seek a compromise to determine which actions are 
the most appropriate in terms of social acceptance and technical validity.   
1. Introduction 
In developing countries, populations and territories are subject to 
multiple risks and vulnerabilities. Actors within such contexts manage 
risk at different scales and levels: authorities, technicians, administra-
tors, territory planners, merchants, local communities, indigenous and 
non-indigenous groups. However, conflicts often arise because each 
actor has their own perception of the problem and particular interests, 
hindering the effectiveness of potential solutions. The challenge for 
decision makers is to involve various stakeholders, integrate risk per-
ceptions and assessments carried out by each actor and seek a 
compromise to determine which actions are the most appropriate in 
terms of social acceptance and technical validity. To achieve this 
compromise, it is necessary to set aside the dichotomy between technical 
and vernacular knowledge in order to explore the complexity of risk 
perception. The conflict between actors over the characterization of 
disaster risk and its resolution is presented here as an opportunity for 
understanding the underlying aspects of a society related to disaster risk. 
The way in which actors conceive and perceive risk reveals aspects that 
are not always considered in risk assessments and the designing of so-
lutions but are nevertheless necessary. 
Starting with the works of White [1]; successive authors have studied 
perceptions of risks and disasters [2–5]. Risk perception can be defined 
as “an assessment of the probability of hazard and the probability of the 
results (most often—the negative consequences) perceived by the soci-
ety” Lechowska [6]:1342). Precisely, authors question how perceptions 
condition risk management [7–9]. According to Gaillard [10] two main 
fields of study on this topic can be identified. Firstly, a group which 
considers that the reaction of each actor is conditioned by their inter-
pretation of a threat to which they are exposed [11,12]. The second 
group regards reactions as mainly limited by social, cultural, economic 
and political forces [13–18]. In addition, some authors consider that 
risks perceived by society can differ from those identified by risk spe-
cialists due to: i) the type of knowledge i.e. technical or vernacular 
[19–21], ii) institutional affiliation [22,23], or iii) being insiders or 
outsiders to disasters [24,25]. Nonetheless, other authors reject thinking 
☆ Present address: Agroecology, Environment and Systems Group, Instituto de Investigaciones Forestales y Agropecuarias de Bariloche (IFAB), INTA-CONICET, 
Modesta Victoria 4450 - CC277 (8400), San Carlos de Bariloche, Río Negro, Argentina. 
E-mail address: fernandez.manuela@inta.gob.ar.  
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102153 
Received 29 July 2020; Received in revised form 21 February 2021; Accepted 22 February 2021   
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 57 (2021) 102153
2
in terms of a division between technical and vernacular knowledge since 
it is a reductive dichotomy [26,27]. Neither the point of view of the 
community nor that of external agents can claim possession of absolute 
truth or be considered as the only legitimate point of view. The di-
chotomies between institutional and non-institutional, technical--
vernacular, internal-external are insufficient to account for the richness 
found in the interpretations of each actor. In turn, such a reductive 
viewpoint neglects the complexity of the interrelationships between 
actors, such as the common ground or rifts that may exist between them, 
which affects management and action itself. 
Disasters are considered serious disruptions of the functioning of a 
system, community or society that cause deaths and material, economic 
and environmental losses, which exceed the capacities of the affected 
community to face the situation using its own resources [28]. While a 
disaster is closely linked to the consequences and unwanted impacts of a 
hazardous event due to a lack of management (or mismanagement), 
disaster risk (DR) is associated with the probability of a hazardous event 
and its negative consequences, in terms of lives, goods, services, liveli-
hoods, etc, occurring as a function of vulnerability, exposure, hazards 
and capacity [28]. The specific interests and varied perceptions of actors 
can often give rise to conflicts during the elaboration of disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) strategies [29–31]. When solutions implemented to 
deal with a given risk are not adequate, not accepted or not used by all 
actors within the territory, the risk can increase and new risks can 
emerge [32–34]. Conflicts highlight social trends related to the accept-
ability of public policies and projects, the role of technical knowledge, 
aspiration, deliberation, and uncertainties [35]. A social conflict can 
arise from socio-psychological dynamics such as opposing values, in-
terests and needs [36] and is most generally described as “a struggle 
over claims to scarce status, power and control of resources” [37]: 5) to 
which actors attribute a value [38]. The root causes of conflict can be 
linked to basic human needs and the availability of resources, as well as 
to structural conditions such as oppressive or unequal social relations 
and to exploitative economic and environmental systems and develop-
ment models [36]. Since conflicts involve ethical and psychological di-
mensions, as well as political, economic and structural ones [36], it is 
accepted as a conceptual and analytical tool. In this work, conflicts are 
considered indicative of the factors that constitute disaster risk (e.g. 
roads in poor condition, lack of hospital infrastructure) and can reveal 
underlying aspects of a society. Using the social constructivism approach 
[39,40] and the PAR model [41], where disaster risk is considered to be 
the result of social, political, economic and historic processes, this work 
not only underlines the differentiated perceptions of risks but also the 
factors that structure vulnerabilities and disaster risk [42]). It is pre-
cisely these factors or root causes of disasters that can crystallize or 
manifest themselves in conflict situations. 
The first objective of this work was to identify the criteria chosen by 
different groups of actors to define and perceive disaster risk, as well as 
the reference systems and approaches mobilized during the risk assess-
ment process. Considering that multiple actors are involved in the 
implementation of solutions and risk management, this work seeks to 
understand how each actor forms their own definition of disaster risk. 
With this in mind, perceptions are analysed by means of risk approaches, 
which are generally divided in two conceptual points of view: the 
dominant paradigm and the radical paradigm [32,43]. Within the 
dominant paradigm we can find i) natural science approaches [44] or 
“pure determinism approaches” [45], where disasters are considered a 
result of natural hazard components and ii) applied science approaches 
[44] or “mechanistic engineering approaches” [45], which focus on 
hazard, exposition and physical vulnerability. Associated DRR strategies 
generally concentrate on structural [46] or technical [47] measures 
concerning human infrastructure, such as housing, public facilities, 
production units, and networks. Meanwhile, in the alternative radical 
paradigm we can find iii) social science approaches [44], oriented to-
wards vulnerability studies and iv) an integrated approach [44], where 
disasters are treated within patterns of daily life and livelihoods, and 
vulnerability is understood as a socially produced condition resulting 
from political, economic and social processes such as underdevelopment 
and marginalization [39,41,42,48]. The DRR associated with this sec-
ond paradigm are based on non-structural measures [46] such as 
poverty and inequality reduction, promotion of both participation by 
the population and governance at the “grassroots level”, and 
community-based disaster risk management [49]. The second objective 
concerns the study of the strategies deployed by actors to legitimize both 
the assessment of disaster risk and its treatment. When resources are 
insufficient, all points of view are not included and actors are forced to 
argue their own interpretations of disaster risk. In a game of negotiation, 
compromise or confrontation, actors mobilize solid arguments to legit-
imize their implementation proposals. Finally, this work addresses the 
decision maker’s dilemma, which is to find a compromise between 
technically valid and socially acceptable (as well as economically viable) 
solutions. This article analyses a post-disaster case study in San Cristóbal 
Verapaz, Guatemala, where a landslide named “Los Chorros” affected 
several communities and one of the main highways West-East access to 
the country. The event had a strong impact on the population regarding 
their perception of landslides and their tragic consequences, blocking 
the movement of goods and people for months, destabilizing the local 
economy and causing conflicts over the adaptation strategies developed 
by risk managers. The study of conflict between actors can reveal the 
underlying causes of disaster risks and thus aid in characterizing and 
analyzing disaster risk in order to improve our understanding. 
2. Material & methods 
2.1. Study area 
The study area is located close to the city of San Cristóbal Verapaz, 
Guatemala, along an active fault called Polochic. This fault is at the 
border between the Caribbean and North American tectonic plates. The 
area is mountainous, containing a series of river valleys and a corridor. 
The RN-7W route was built along this corridor to link the east and west 
of the country, causing significant urbanization and densification in the 
area. The majority of the population (85%) is indigenous, from the 
Mayan Pokomch’í ethnic group. Some 32% of the population live in 
urban areas and the remaining 68% in rural hamlets. Administratively, 
these communities are organized in COCODES (Communal Develop-
ment Councils) and are mainly dedicated to the cultivation of corn, 
beans, sugar cane and fruits. There are also gypsum deposits in the area 
that belong to the COCODES and are exploited by a group that transports 
the mineral. 
In accordance with the Road Development Plan, the RN-7W repre-
sents an opportunity for the economic, social and cultural development 
of the country. The RN-7W route is of vital importance for local residents 
and merchants, as it allows access to local markets, urban health centres 
and schools. In turn, the RN-7W is used by gypsum transporters since 
this road directly connects to the capital and the main gypsum company 
named Cementos Progreso via the CA-14 road (see Fig. 1). 
On January 4, 2009, a large landslide called “Los Chorros” occurred 
in the area. A series of large blocks separated from the side of the 
mountain, moving between 8 and 10 million cubic meters of rock. The 
activation area was located at an altitude between 1300 and 2020 m 
above sea level. The collapsed material moved downstream at high 
speed in the form of an avalanche of stones and extended for 2 km, to an 
altitude of 950 m, halfway along the Agua Blanca valley [50]. The 
landslide destroyed 1.2 km of the RN-7W road [51]. Official reports 
recorded a total of 34 people dead, 30 missing, 20 wounded, 928 people 
evacuated and 1893 transferred to shelters [52,53]. The road’s 
destruction and subsequent closure to all crossing negatively impacted 
the population: blocking the movement of people and goods for months, 
interrupting activities and functions (commercial, school, health and 
community, among others), and destabilizing both the local and 
regional economy. Due to the impacts of the landslide hazard, the 
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vulnerability of the local population to such disruption and a lack of 
local capacity to mitigate the impacts, the situation in Los Chorros can 
be classified as a disaster. Due to the scale of the event, a special com-
mission was formed under the responsibility of the country’s 
Vice-President to assess the situation and agree on measures. Three 
priorities were established: the emergency response, the construction of 
an emergency route and the search for a safe route for the RN-7W road 
[51]. 
3. Methods 
An empirical case study approach was chosen for this work [54–56] 
with the aim of studying a contemporary phenomenon in-depth within 
its real-world context. Three instances of fieldwork were carried out in 
2009, 2011 and 2013, producing a total of 11 months of observation. 
This was followed by verification and monitoring of the situation in 
2017. The practices approach, known as Practical sciences [57,58], was 
used to study modus operandi (ways of doing things) in order to highlight 
how each actor defines what is at risk and the solution to deal with it. 
Practices are inserted in a context and cannot be understood as mere 
behaviour [59] because they refer on the one hand to the ways in which 
actors establish links between them, in a space structured by the in-
stitutions and organizations of society, and on the other hand to the 
subjectivity produced by each actor via their biographical trajectories, 
routines and practical knowledge. By observing each actors practices, 
the researcher is able to identify the main characteristics of a society: the 
structures and institutions into which individuals fit as well as the ex-
changes, information and games of power that are established through 
these practices. During fieldwork, participant observation [60], 
photography, and video capture were used to interpret the practices of 
the actors in their real-world contexts. This was made possible by the 
acceptance of the researcher by those people being observed. Practices 
were captured during engagement in shared activities and tasks with 
observed individuals as well as outside of direct interaction. In both 
cases, and when circumstances permitted, notes, photos and videos were 
taken as necessary for identifying aspects of observed activities that had 
not been grasped by the researcher in real time. In addition, these re-
cordings were useful for identifying criteria that were of interest at the 
time of observation but afterwards forgotten. A total of 64 interviews 
were conducted and transcribed, with the principal goal of asking “what 
the actors say” and “what they do” to face disaster risk. Interviewees 
were local actors either directly impacted by landslide or involved in its 
local management (28) and institutional managers (36) (Fig. 3 and 
Fig. 4). The interviews were carried out either individually, by family or 
by group. Secondary sources such as maps, GPS, sketches, aerial pho-
tographs and satellite images, census and official statistics, institutional 
reports and laws were also used in this investigation. Secondary data 
was associated with data collected through practice observation and 
semi-structured interviews (see Fig. 2), establishing a triangulation 
strategy [55] capable of relating data, theories and the observer’s role as 
a researcher. This case study is appropriate for such triangulation and 
integration of various data sources, given that it is essential for this 
research when considering the nature of the study object (risk) and the 
diversity of the criteria defining it. Finally, a table was constructed to 
encompass the strategies deployed by the actors during the conflict and 
the negotiation process. Data from a literature review was combined 
with that from fieldwork interviews and analysis to build a further table 
displaying the range of issues defended during the negotiation and 
Fig. 1. Map of main routes of Guatemala and the study area.  
Fig. 2. Methods utilised during the fieldwork stage.  
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conflict phases, along with approaches, risk definitions and measures as 
selected by the actors at Los Chorros. 
4. Results 
4.1. Description of actors 
Successive institutions and actors appeared immediately after the 
landslide in response to the event. The actors present in the territory are 
(Fig. 5):  
• Representatives of political power at local, regional and national 
levels. Their means and resources come largely from their institu-
tional and formal legitimacy that is associated with their political 
function.  
• Representatives of the professional body involved in danger and risk 
management: the National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction 
(CONRED). Their means and resources come from their legitimacy in 
an expert role with membership in a recognized professional body.  
• Representatives of the state institution CAMINOS, responsible for the 
country’s road development. Since the Los Chorros landslide 
destroyed one of the country’s main routes (RN7W) the institution 
holds a fundamental role in the search for solutions.  
• The National Electrification Institute (INDE) installed one of the 
most important hydroelectric plants in the country in the city of San 
Cristóbal Verapaz, where the landslide took place.  
• Representatives of the Mayan indigenous communities. Their means 
and resources are derived from their social legitimacy associated 
with the organization of the community itself and from their political 
legitimacy, recognized in the National Constitution after the signing 
of the Peace Accords in 1996 and the successive law reforms.  
• Economic and/or civil society representatives (transporters, gypsum 
operators, and merchants) are not formally organized. However, 
these actors are capable of mobilizing at all times and of imposing 
themselves as key actors when their interests are affected. They also 
have economic resources and social capital that allow them to 
intervene and carry out specific actions. 
• Other actors were contacted for their technical knowledge or finan-
cial capacity: researchers and university professors, and 
Fig. 3. Distribution of interviews carried out with individuals from the 
different institutions involved in the Los Chorros landslide. 
Fig. 4. Distribution of interviews carried out with actors of the different 
community groups. 
Fig. 5. Organization chart of the actors involved in risk management in Los Chorros and the scales of intervention Fernandez [61]:142.  
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representatives of international cooperation agencies such as JICA 
(Japan International Cooperation agency) and non-governmental 
organizations. 
4.2. Risk definitions & actions 
Actions are launched by different stakeholders to respond to the 
emergency, build an emergency route and find a safe place for the RN- 
7W (Fig. 6), in accordance with their own disaster risk definitions and 
risk analysis situation. 
4.2.1. CONRED’s definition of risk 
Geological studies were carried out to define the area at risk, 
involving the analysis of geological maps, identification of faults and 
lithology, visual inspection to identify sinks and type of material 
removed (quantity, grain size and composition) and measurement of the 
slope. CONRED declared a “high risk area” inside which any and all 
activity, either state or private in nature, was prohibited. This area took 
into account exposed elements such as families living in areas deemed as 
at-risk (using polygons classified from higher to lower risk), land and 
houses built on secondary faults, the emergency road, communities 
located west of the Los Chorros landslide, the possible new design of the 
road and the supply tunnel for the INDE hydroelectric plant. 
4.2.2. Government definition 
In mid-January 2009, the government inaugurated the emergency 
road at the bottom of the Agua Blanca valley (in red, Fig. 6), at an 
altitude lower than the landslide, but within the limits of the risk area 
determined by CONRED. Construction of the road was possible because 
the authorities considered it a mitigation measure, and therefore in 
compliance with the standard of high-risk declarations. According to the 
government, this alternative route prevented RN-7W users from using 
the destroyed and high-exposure section. The decision was governed by 
the need for an immediate (political) response. In this sense, it was the 
result of a political decision rather than a technical one. 
4.2.3. CAMINOS definition and the definitive route 
CAMINOS aimed to complete the East-West connection of the 
country through its Northern region. CAMINOS sought a suitable final 
route for the RN-7W taking into account political requests and expert 
opinion. For them, the original location of the RN-7W (through the 
landslide) would have been the best option, considering national and 
local interests, but this was no longer an option after CONRED’s risk 
assessment. CAMINOS hired companies to carry out geological studies 
and social surveys with the aim of understanding the complexity of the 
situation and the real impacts on the territory. Using this information 
they finally proposed a route outside of the risk polygon (in black, 
Fig. 6). 
4.2.4. Community definition (indigenous communities, carriers, shippers, 
merchants) 
The usefulness of the emergency road was not satisfactory for a large 
number of local users. It was too narrow for trucks and involved trav-
elling more kilometers than the RN-7W. Its steep slope presented both a 
risk to the lives of drivers and “cuadrillas” (groups of daily workers) and 
a possibility of loss of transported products. Furthermore, the group of 
gypsum carriers did not use this road because it was unsuitable for trucks 
with heavy loads. Minibuses responsible for passenger transport were 
the only appropriate vehicles (in terms of size) for the institutional 
emergency route. Minibus owners took advantage of this situation to 
increase the price of the trip and as a consequence many people could no 
longer afford it. Only occasional travelers with private vehicles took this 
official route. Without the RN7W, the local and regional economy was 
quickly affected. In fear that the final route would be built far from their 
territories (according to the CAMINOS proposal), and thus leave them 
geographically, culturally and socially isolated, representatives of the 
COCODES, city merchants and a group of shippers organized a meeting 
to discuss their needs. They asked the government to rebuild the RN-7W, 
but their proposal was denied out of respect for norms, laws, and the 
CONRED risk declaration. 
Facing a refusal from the government, they formed a Route Com-
mittee and started to rebuild the RN-7W themselves, a few meters south 
of the original route (green route, Fig. 6). Each group of actors 
Fig. 6. Road map and solutions to Los Chorros, Fernandez [33]: 164.  
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collaborated voluntarily and performed various tasks. Men and women 
from the 19 affected indigenous communities offered unpaid workdays. 
They organized themselves into teams that took turns. Carriers lent their 
trucks to transport villagers to their workplace and merchants ran 
donation drives and gave meals to laborers. The machinery necessary for 
construction was supplied by one of the carriers. The road construction 
took 40 days. Before its inauguration, the communities performed 
Mayan rituals called “quema” (“burnings”), through which they asked 
the mountain spirits to protect their route and avoid movements on the 
slopes. Although the ritual is part of their traditions and customs, asking 
for protection for the path and stability of the mountain is a sign that 
they implicitly recognized the danger and considered it in their evalu-
ation. Once opened, a toll was installed to recover the money invested 
and control the security of the route, prohibiting the passage at night 
(from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m.) and in case of rain. They also installed warning 
signs on each side of the landslide announcing that the crossing was 
dangerous. This was how these groups became increasingly active on the 
risk management scene, taking over not only construction but also the 
road monitoring and maintenance system. 
4.3. Strategies - legitimation & conflict situation 
The Route Committee produced a document to convince the au-
thorities that its initiative was founded on solid arguments. They did not 
focus attention at the local level, but rather provided a broader view of 
the risk situation at a multi-scale level. If CONRED established a risk area 
that strictly corresponded to the dimensions of the natural phenomenon, 
the community group delimited the impact areas at a regional level. The 
magnitude of risk was associated with exposed elements and vulnera-
bilities that go beyond the dimensions of natural hazards, such as every- 
day life and basic needs. The committee provided the following exam-
ples: “The considerable drop in the local employment linked to crafts; 
Absolute paralysis of all types of transportation; Paralysis of income 
sources in marketing, groceries, agricultural products, horticultural 
products and livestock products; Paralysis of mining (gypsum); Vital 
need to move from one place to another; People still risk their lives by 
crossing the landslide area, declared impassable and high risk. This is 
due to the fact that there is no nearby, cheap and viable route; Partial 
and total loss of the coffee and pacaya harvest; Total paralysis of all 
transactions between the departments and other places located west of 
the highway and the town of San Cristóbal Verapaz; Most of the com-
munities and people who travel for tourist, commercial or business 
purposes would deviate from our municipality and we will therefore be 
isolated” (Comité de ruta [62]: 1–2; translated by the author). In addi-
tion, the committee was against CAMINOS′ newly proposed route in a 
region far from Los Chorros, mobilizing environmental criteria. 
Almost all road users (merchants, farmers, transport groups, regular, 
casual and local travelers) preferred to take the route rebuilt by the 
community because it was faster and the toll was cheaper when 
compared to the cost of gasoline incurred on the longer trip using the 
state emergency road. CONRED experts prohibited the use of the com-
munity route, mainly for safety reasons, due to its high exposure to 
landslides. Both those responsible for the Los Chorros case (Vice Presi-
dent and Ministers) and CAMINOS were opposed to the community 
route, following the recommendations of CONRED. The Ministry of 
Communications and Infrastructure placed no-go signs. Despite this, 
people continued to use the community route. From that moment on, the 
political authorities came into conflict with the Route Committee and in 
an opposition game, each actor deployed strategies to convince and 
maintain their position (Table 1). The set of strategies is described 
below.  
- Deterrence: CONRED met the Route Committee to convince them of 
the danger of their road. They explained the reasons for the prohi-
bition of access to the route using physical vulnerability, the degree 
of exposure, respect for the laws and the declaration of risk. How-
ever, the community group did not accept this explanation and 
highlighted the shortcomings of the official emergency route. The 
group also opposed any final route outside of the original location 
and asked for its road to be maintained by the authorities (since the 
community road required very expensive maintenance) and for 
studies to be carried out to improve the conditions of the route.  
- Recourse to laws: The Route Committee prepared a petition signed 
by thousands of people. They generated a memorandum specifying 
the deterioration of the economy and abandonment. To justify their 
request, they drew attention to questions of legality by mentioning 
certain social, political, and environmental laws and codes. 
- Lobbying: Community leaders and initiators of the movement ob-
tained hearings and sessions with legislative and executive agents at 
the national level through departmental and local deputies.  
- Route blockade: During the meeting with the representatives of the 
Guatemalan Congress, the Route Committee mentioned the possi-
bility of a national strike. The government, faced with this warning, 
found it necessary to respond quickly. A national strike was deemed 
too risky for the country’s economy. Furthermore, the reputation of 
the National Government would also be at stake due to the negative 
image that such a demonstration would generate. Consequently, the 
Vice President, under strong political pressure, travelled to Los 
Chorros to calm the population and find a compromise. When an 
agreement with the Vice President was not reached, the community 
group blocked the passage of the CA-14 highway at El Cruce level for 
half a day, cutting off the country’s northern connection with 
Guatemala City.  
- The armed forces, riot police, and the physical resistance of the 
community: The government decided to use public force to prevent 
people passing through the community route. The army and police 
were sent to the area. This action was not well received by the 
community group and resulted in a strong reaction. Summoned by 
community leaders, the local population gathered in Los Chorros to 
prevent official security forces from removing maintenance ma-
chines from the road. The situation was complicated as children, 
women and men confronted the official forces with their own bodies, 
using machetes as weapons. The national government finally ordered 
the army and the police to withdraw from the area.  
- Summon the press: The community group continued to request the 
maintenance of its highway and detailed studies of the area. The 
government, for its part, encouraged the use of the official road in 
Agua Blanca and, to appease the population, announced that 
CAMINOS would take over the maintenance of the community route. 
After this did not happen, the community group decided to put 
pressure on the media, publicizing their actions and demands in the 
press. 
4.4. Post-flood concessions, INDE-defined risks and the community route 
as the only solution 
Heavy precipitation carried a huge amount of sediment and rock 
from the landslide to the valley floor, forming a dam on the Chixoy River 
and leading to flooding of the government’s emergency route. Upstream 
of this natural dam, the water level continued to rise and endanger the 
pipeline of INDE’s Chixoy hydroelectric plant. Given that the power 
plant produces 30% of the country’s energy, the national authorities and 
Table 1 
Strategies mobilized by each actor in the Los Chorros case to legitimize their 
position and definition of risk.  
Authorities Community Group CONRED CAMINOS 




lobby, road block, body 
resistance, media pressure, 
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INDE focused all their attention on how to face this danger. INDE 
evaluated the danger of flooding, focusing its attention on the pipeline as 
an exposed element. They proposed to create a diversion channel and in 
the end the pipe was not damaged, though the emergency route 
remained impassable. The community route thus became the only 
alternative route. 
One year after the event, without an emergency route and without a 
definitive route due to a lack of funds, the only option was that of the 
community. Throughout 2010, the national government began to 
concede. Several attempts were made to stabilize the slope and the 
government accepted responsibility for the maintenance of the route, 
despite the fact that the CONRED risk statement was still in force. Also, 
since funds from the toll implemented by the community could not cover 
maintenance costs, the government agreed to use public funds to 
reimburse the costs and debts incurred during route construction and 
maintenance. 
Considering that this work was carried out over several years, it can 
be seen as a longitudinal study that enables an analysis of the evolution 
of risk perceptions. At Los Chorros, actors’ perceptions remained the 
same over time, with the exception of the government that was made 
certain concessions and accepted the demands and points of view of the 
population. There was a change of presidential and municipal govern-
ment in 2012, which the community group took advantage of to 
establish themselves as a legal group before the Municipal Development 
Council. Thus, the group known as the Road Committee obtained a vote 
and were able to formulate their requests within an institutional 
framework. Thanks to this new statute, the group had a “libro de actas” 
(“minute book”), through which it compiled a record of all actions and 
discussions related to the route. These minutes constitute official doc-
uments that serve as legally recognized evidence and formalize their 
definition of disaster risk. Since this recognition, the mayor and the 
newly legitimized community group defended the same interests. In 
2013, at the request of both parties, CONRED visited Los Chorros to 
carry out a new study. Technicians confirmed that the landslide was still 
active and that material would most likely fall, leading them to maintain 
their disaster risk definition. However, they did not deny the possibility 
of modifying the risk area, provided that new studies were carried out 
that could show the landslide conditions had changed and the slope was 
stabilized. With regards to CAMINOS’ proposed route, it was con-
strained by a lack of financial resources. The new government still did 
not grant a special budget for the completion of the RN-7W project. 
National authorities were pressured by social demands and did not dare 
free up resources for this work. Since then and until the time of writing, 
no decision has been made. In 2017, monitoring work was carried out 
and verified that the situation continued unchanged. At this time the 
community path was in poor condition and remained the only viable 
solution. Community residents and road users have adapted to this 
precarious situation by developing codes of behavior that make them 
safer, such as prohibiting traffic at night, monitoring of the landslide by 
neighbors, and forbidding passage in the event of earth movement, noise 
from falling rocks or heavy rains. These behaviors are important but not 
sufficient to safeguard the lives of people and road users. As stated by 
CONRED, the community route is highly exposed and consequently 
cannot be deemed acceptable without protection work. 
5. Discussions 
The first objective was to identify the criteria chosen by each group 
of actors and evaluate how they implemented a set of prioritization 
criteria for defining risk. From the interviews and observation of prac-
tices, it is possible to affirm that the actors in the Los Chorros case 
consider very varied criteria when defining a risk situation. These 
criteria are material, symbolic, natural, economic, social and cultural, 
and are linked to the types of vulnerabilities that actors face and 
recognize. For example, even if they do not name it in these terms, in 
their disaster risk definition the community group refers to unsafe 
conditions, their everyday life and their different dimensions of 
vulnerability: social, organizational, ecological, economic, etc. Specif-
ically, they refer to an educational vulnerability due to the interruption 
of school years, an economic vulnerability caused by a lack of employ-
ment and access to work, and an ecological vulnerability caused by 
deforestation should a new route be built. As for state actors, they speak 
directly of physical vulnerability and exposed elements. Each actor 
makes a cost-benefit trade off regarding post-disaster investment. If state 
actors favor the issues of energy (INDE, Government), protection 
(CONRED) and east-west communication (CAMINOS, Government), 
community actors prefer to preserve and defend aspects related to their 
basic needs, subsistence and the organization of their territory (Table 2). 
Different disaster risk approaches [44] used by risk managers are 
highlighted (Table 2).  
- CONRED used an applied science approach in which the explanatory 
factor of the disaster was the natural event. When CONRED delimited 
the at-risk polygon it considered the natural event (dimension, fre-
quency, magnitude) as well as exposed elements such as houses, the 
RN-7W, human life and infrastructure. It proposed structural mea-
sures corresponding to the applied science approach, namely build-
ing a new route outside of the risk area, mitigation measures or 
technical studies.  
- The Route Committee based its interpretation of risk on an approach 
close to the social sciences, prioritizing the population’s living con-
ditions which encompasses food security, housing, economic secu-
rity, and social ties. For example, they highlighted the interruption of 
both communication between communities and of functional aspects 
within the territory. From their point of view, being isolated repre-
sented not only an economic loss but also a loss of relationships. In 
summary, the local population perceived risk in a broader sense than 
institutional actors, which used more restrictive criteria.  
- CAMINOS wanted to put the country’s East-West connection into 
service, carrying out socio-economic and geological studies to this 
end. It worked from an integrated approach that took into account 
danger, exposed elements and different vulnerabilities. It incorpo-
rated concerns raised by various actors into its analysis, including the 
technical arguments of CONRED, regional city mayors’ needs, the 
Ministry of Communications and Infrastructure’s plan, the needs of 
merchants, the points of view of the people directly affected by the 
landslide and the community group.  
- INDE evaluated risk from an applied science approach as it identified 
the danger of flooding and the pipeline as an exposed element. It 
quantified the possible economic loss and proposed a structural 
measure (the diversion channel) to deal with the risk. 
The second objective was to analyze the solution-building process 
and, more specifically, the strategies mobilized by actors to affirm their 
position and their proposed solution. Risk management measures 
depend on the specific arbitrations of each actor and their ability to be 
recognized as legitimate. The acceptable risk for the actors and, there-
fore, their solution and/or treatment are constituted as the product of 
their relations and social forces. The question of acceptability is closely 
linked to the ability to govern and refers to the processes of negotiation 
and arbitration, the consideration of decisions and the legitimacy of 
actors and actions. In the case of Los Chorros, each actor uses various 
intervention logics, ranging from consensus to integrating aspects 
revealed by other actors and, finally, closed oppositions. Technicians 
and authorities were able to cooperate and establish agreements by 
proposing an alternative route. Their interests were not exactly the 
same, but neither were they antagonistic. For this reason, they managed 
to negotiate and share the same solutions. As for the gypsum trans-
porters and indigenous communities, they found common ground 
through prioritizing economic problems and access to resources. They 
made compromises and imposed their own representation of risk, 
rebuilding the road on the spot, and developing both a surveillance 
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system and an ad-hoc alarm system. No compromise was made between 
the Route Committee and the rest of the risk managers regarding the 
characterization of disaster risk. It is for this reason that the actors 
entered into conflict and two distinct solutions were established in the 
territory: the official route and the community route. The second seemed 
more effective in terms of attendance and also addressed a large set of 
vulnerabilities. Regardless, it was unacceptable to technicians and au-
thorities as it violated both their professional and deontological codes. 
They could not validate this alternative route, and therefore legitimize 
it, as it posed a serious problem in terms of liability. They could not bear 
the consequences if there were to be further destruction of the road in 
this particularly exposed sector. On the other hand, the official route has 
been disabled and the proposal for a definitive route outside of the 
danger area, while meeting the technical criteria, failed to satisfy the 
population as it directly and indirectly undermined their society from 
economic, social, health and educational points of view. The official 
solutions were the typical structural measures made from a hazard- 
related point of view and did not consider the factors, dynamics and 
processes which lead to local unsafe conditions. 
6. Conclusions 
Although this case study is different to situations in developed 
countries, lessons related to post-disaster decision-making processes can 
be applied worldwide. The importance of an inclusive approach to 
disaster management is highlighted when we accept that multiple vul-
nerabilities can exist and that every actor has specific knowledge, as is 
evident when examining the case of Los Chorros. The management 
proposal that emerges from the Guatemalan example invites another 
way of conceiving risk management through identifying and integrating 
the risk perceptions of the actors that are on the ground. This means 
abandoning the dichotomy between technical and vernacular knowl-
edge to go in search of the complexity of risk perceptions. As seen in Los 
Chorros, neither individual solution is satisfactory in itself. When not all 
risk components are taken into consideration, solutions are incomplete 
and incapable of fully solving the problem. Sectoral approaches lead to 
segmented measures, omitting the diversity of factors that are at play in 
a risk situation and prompt decision makers to make conjectures and 
inadequate or insufficient decisions when faced with a risk situation. In 
light of the results presented here, this work encourages the 
incorporation of community-based approaches as long as they are 
complemented with other perspectives and ways of interpreting disaster 
risk. 
Finally, we studied the social conflict at Los Chorros in order to 
understand the underlying aspects of society and understand what 
constitutes disaster risk in a given context. The root causes of conflicts 
are related to the structural aspects of society such as economic models 
and production, distribution of power and participation, and can be 
closely intertwined with the root causes of disasters, in accordance with 
the PAR model. In this sense, by analyzing the causes of conflicts and 
listening to the voices of the actors, it is possible to identify the root 
causes of disasters and the elements that historically generate the vul-
nerabilities of a society. The comprehensive consideration of the per-
spectives of all actors that are involved in the problem is not the panacea 
for this challenge, but it can help decision makers to improve disaster 
risk management and to consider broader risk criteria and integrated 
solutions. This will allow decision makers to identify technically valid 
and socially acceptable risk measures. 
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desarrollo, Polis. Rev. Latinoamericana (2009) 23. 
[59] S. Catellin, L’abduction: une pratique de la découverte scientifique et littéraire, 
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